Sensation refers to sensory experience, and epistemology is the philosophy or theory of knowledge, after the Latin episteme, meaning "knowledge". Epistemology and sensation are side-by-side because they have a long, complex, and sometimes tense relationship, and the relationship is important for appreciating that what is 
because sensation presents us with colors, sounds, smells, etc., when, as an atomist, he believed that only atoms and emptiness truly exist. Plato (427-347 BC) also disregarded sensation, but this time it was on the grounds that it offered detail and change, when true knowledge of any subject consisted in perception of its singular, perfect, unchanging essence, which he called its "Form". Plato's pupil Aristotle (384-322 BC) turned things around with yet another epistemology.
Categories used in the production of knowledge, he maintained, were not derived from the Forms but were ordering principles active in sensory perception. The value of the five senses lay in that each sense was a distinct form of perception (now called a "modality") attuned to objects of a certain kind, which he termed its "special objects", i.e., sight is attuned to colors, hearing to sounds, etc., and, as such, contributed to the discrimination required for knowledge. The fact that there are objects that can be perceived by more than one sense -movement (for example, it can be seen and heard), rest, number, figure and magnitude, what Aristotle termed "common sensibles" -posed a problem, which he sought to explain by claiming that the senses can form a unity. were the Kantian notions that experience is organized by a structure that doesn't necessarily divide up neatly into "human subject" and "world" and that, with different structures in place, different forms of experience might be possible.
Analytic and continental approaches to the "given"
A case in point to illustrate the difference between analytic and continental approaches is the question: What is given in experience? An analytic answer is
H.H. Price's attempt to determine what seeing itself actually is. Price suggests that,
when something is presented to consciousness, for example, a tomato, although it can be doubted that it is a tomato, what cannot be doubted is that there is a red, round patch in front of the perceiver. This state of being present to consciousness Price terms "being given", and the item that is present he calls a "sense-datum".
Price's endeavor to identify the constituents of sensation as they are experienced is widely criticized within analytic epistemology on the grounds that the notion of immediate acquaintance is undermined by its reliance upon general, mediating concepts such as "red", "patch", 'round ', etc. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 -1951 is frequently invoked to make the Kantian point that all references to sensation, no Epistemology and sensation 5 matter how private, presuppose a shared language. Nonetheless, the idea that we sense the world not directly but indirectly through intermediaries, still often referred to as sense data, has become a widely-held view, known as the representational view. It persists because it is judged to be consistent with scientific, physical, and causal theories of perception that rely upon units or intermediaries within perception.
In terms of continental epistemology, due to interest from Kant to Heidegger in what makes experience possible, human subject and world are not assumed as the starting points, so there is no talk of a subject in receipt of the given. Instead, starting from the fact that there is experience, attention is paid to what happens when the flow of experience is interrupted by the decision to describe it.
Sensation is not seen as a datum whose contents can be individuated. Rather, experience is taken to be a condition of being-in-the-world (the hyphens signal that the subject-object distinction does not apply), and focusing upon and describing sensory qualities are taken as "interruptions" that are valuable because sensations have been identified and situated within a wider context. Here is an indication of the difference between the analytic and continental approaches: The former aims to clarify concepts, the latter to revivify experience or change what it is understood to be. Jean-Paul Sartre (1905 Sartre ( -1980 , a critic of Heidegger's, arguably does the most to show how description stimulates sensation, with his philosophical novel Nausea being a highlight.
Epistemology and sensation naturalized?
Developments in the science of sensation have had an impact on analytic epistemology. Attempts to understand the senses from a purely philosophical perspective have been challenged on the grounds that any understanding of sensation will be theoretically informed, and scientific studies are regularly revising the concepts from which theories of perception are constructed. In philosophical terms, this means epistemology and sensation have become naturalized, that is, the Epistemology and sensation 6 facts and descriptions generated by science are more accurate than logical deductions based on observation. For example, one of the long-standing questions in the philosophy of the senses is: How many senses are there? A widely-cited criterion for what counts as a sensory modality, offered by H.P. Grice, is the introspectible character of sensation, e.g., first-person, inward reflection on how seeing differs from touching. However, according to Brian Keeley, there is growing evidence from science that people possess a vomeronasal system, the ability to detect pheromones, without being consciously aware they are doing so.
In other words, pheromone detection has no introspectible character. This suggests that Grice's criterion has to be abandoned. However, it should be noted that Keeley's definition of a sensory modality is one that, as he admits, is useful to science, couched in terms of wired-up organs that facilitate behavior with regard to a specific physical class of energy. Against this, some argue that such sciencefriendly accounts are effectively changing the subject and defining the senses in such a way that they are no longer what they are commonly held to be.
It is a problem that is hard to avoid once it is recognized that knowledge is always structured by concepts. As soon as an instrument or definition or theory is applied, a commitment is made, a particular section of reality is placed in a frame and given a meaning and value, and everything outside that frame is subordinated or dismissed. On the plus side, it means that the study served by the frame can go ahead, the meaning and value can be put to work in a method, and conclusions can be drawn. On the minus side, a lot of reality is excluded which, given a different frame, could have had a bearing, if not on the study in question, then on a related one. The situation is pertinent to epistemology and sensation because the senses change depending on which epistemology is adopted. Sensation can only enter discourse through description but the description, far from merely capturing what is there, imposes its own frame, and emphasizes a particular character within, or even assigns a character to, sensation. This conundrum ensures that the relation between epistemology and sensation remains complex.
